A few weeks after Kokang fell under the boots, shoes and sandals of the invading Burmese Army, Bao Ai Roong, Commander of the United Wa State Army’s 318th Brigade, which is responsible for security along the border with Kokang, was summoned to brief his superiors in Panghsang, the UWSA’s central headquarters.

The main question he faced was how he allowed the Kokang forces, under the command of Peng Jaisheng, to be defeated in just three days of fighting. After all, his main base Namteuk (Nandeng in Chinese) is divided from Kokang’s Chinshwehaw (Qingshuihe), where the main battle was taking place, only by the Namting, which could be crossed along a bridge over it.

Bao Ai Roong, who is the nephew of Wa supremo Bao Youxiang, gave several reasons including two main ones:

• There wasn’t a joint combat command set up to coordinate and direct the operation
• There wasn’t even a communication line set up between Qingshuihe and Namteuk (“When our troops arrived there in the afternoon of 29 August, they [Kokang] had already abandoned their mountain bases and retreated into China,” he said.)

These summed up the flaws on the ceasefire groups’ side that had been resisting the Burmese Army’s April demand to transform into Border Guard Forces (BGFs), nominally run by the ceasefire officers but practically by Burmese Army officers. “Unless our minimum political demands are met, we will never surrender,” said a Wa officer. The demands in a nutshell are autonomy and democracy.

Giving in to the growing pressure, three of the ceasefire groups that had co-founded the Peace and Democracy Front (PDF) in 1989 had formed a joint military command. Confirmed reports also said the Shan State Army (SSA) ‘North’ that operates on the Wa’s western border, and the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) that has its 4th Brigade operating in northern Shan State had also been accepted as allies outside the PDF.

To all appearances, the five ceasefire groups, two of whom – the UWSA and the KIA – are reputedly the strongest, would be able to repel any attack by the Burmese Army simultaneously.

However, when the real thing came in August in Kokang, the alliance found itself, to use the Cold War euphemism, a paper tiger. In just three days of fighting, the resistance in Kokang, without the expected assistance from its allies, collapsed.

Fortunately, the Burmese Army did not follow up with another attack on other weaker ceasefire armies, leaving the alliance a precious breather to reform and re-plan, so the same disaster does not befall any of them.

The crucial question of course is have they taken advantage of the break to reform and re-plan? So far no reports in that respect have been forthcoming which does not necessarily mean the flaws have not been rectified yet.

Meanwhile, the Burmese Army has been busy waging a relentless psychological warfare:

• The UWSA, SSA North and the National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA) aka Mongla have concluded separate deals with the Burmese Army.
• The UWSA’s Thai-border based 171st Military Region, commanded by tycoon Wei Xuegang, is breaking away from Panghsang
• The SSA South, led by Col Yawdserk, one of the main reasons why the UWSA has been allowed to exist this long, is ready to “exchange arms for peace”

As a result, six of the ceasefire groups – officially numbering 17 – have reportedly agreed to the BGF demand, leaving only six, still virtually saying ‘NO,’ after excluding five other groups that have either surrendered or quit the ceasefire pact. (See attached chart)

Out of the remaining six, three are closest to each other: SSA North, UWSA and NDAA. While the other three are located in isolated base areas: the KIA, Kayan New Land Party (KNLP) and New Mon State Party (NMSP).

It is clear that not a single group has a chance fighting separately. Their only chance for survival and ultimate victory depend on unified command, coordination and cooperation.

One can only hope that bitter lessons from August have been learnt.