Since the ceasefire agreement was signed on 2 December 2012, between the Shan State Army and Naypyitaw, the Burma Army appears to have been more active especially in Eastern Shan State, where its Triangle Region Command with its headquarters in Kengtung, is stationed.
On the Thai-Burmese border, it is taking advantage of the ceasefire to overhaul its strategic roads and garrisons. Its units are also scouring the countryside to push the SSA forces to their border bases.
Its explanation is that as Homong and Monghta sub-townships, opposite Thailand’s Maehongson and Chiangmai provinces, have been reserved for the SSA (although Burma Army units, at least 7 battalions, and the United Wa State Army’s two brigades have yet to show any signs to withdraw), the SSA doesn’t have any business remaining outside the roughly 500 square mile territory.
As to be expected, the SSA has refused to budge, saying that wasn’t what was agreed at the meetings, both pre-and formal. According to the 16 January agreement, Homong and Monghta have been designated as main offices for the SSA and the agreement does not include anything about its forces outside the territory. It also claims that U Aung Min, Naypyitaw’s chief envoy, had agreed that Burma Army units would be responsible for security on the main roads and towns, and SSA the rest, at least for the time being. And that any difference between the two should be resolved through negotiations and not by force.
The result was inevitable: the pushers and those refuse to be pushed have no other options but to fight it out. At least 11 clashes have taken place between the two, with 7 of them in Eastern Shan State: 3 in Mongiang and 4 in Tachilek. And the clashes in Tachilek, as each day passes, are growing into a long drawn out battle.
The two in northern Shan State are also noteworthy. It began with an invitation to Lt Ta Long of the SSA to dinner by the Hsipaw-based Infantry Battalion 23 at its foothill camp near the village of Haikwi on 17 February. Unsuspectingly, he had gone there with his wife and their 3 year old son in a motorbike.
On his way back, the ambushers from IB 23 had allowed the security guard to pass through and fired at him. And while his wife was holding him in her arms and weeping, she was shot to death.
As for his son, his whereabouts is unknown, though Kawli Media says he is believed to be at the Lashio regional HQ.
The result was predictable: at least two clashes have taken place between the two sides since the incident, one on 17 February, following the ambush, and the other two days later.
The obvious question therefore is: Are the government and the army playing good guy and bad guy against the armed resistance movements? Or, is the army bent on discrediting the government whenever and wherever the opportunity is given?
Lt-Gen Yawdserk, the SSA leader, who keeps in touch with Naypyitaw, seems to believe in “we and the government vs. the Burma Army and its militias,” as he told SHAN.
Looking at what’s happening in Kachin and Shan states, one thing appears to be certain: the Tatmadaw is caught in a psychological trap of its own making.
The late Barbara Tuchman has something to say about this in her The March of Folly (1984):
Character is fate, as the Greeks believed. Germans were schooled in winning objectives by force, unschooled in adjustment. They could not bring themselves to forgo aggrandizement even at the risk of defeat.
She might have been speaking the same about the Burmese military.
So where does that leave us, especially the long-suffering people of Burma, who richly deserve peace and rule of law?
