Breathtaking drone footage provides bird’s eye panoramas of hitherto unseen waterfalls, rapids and ancient temples nestled among the countless islands in the Pang river, out of bounds for decades due to the ongoing ethnic armed conflict, to astonished viewers.

The 1996 to 1998 forced relocation of twelve townships in central Shan State included Kun Hing, Nam Zarng, Lai Kha, Ke See, Murng Kerng, Murng Nai, Lang Kher, Murmg Su, Murng Pan, Murng Paeng, Loi Lem and Ho Pong.

Although this particular central Shan State township scenic and tragic narrative centers around Kun Hing, the actual affected areas included adjacent twelve townships involving some 300,000 people.

In order to understand the bitterness of the Shan people and as to why this issue of Mong Ton Dam is fast becoming the Shan people’s  “Alamo” or last crucial political bastion, one would need to look at another two written documentation reports; namely, “Dispossessed” and “License to Rape”. The former published by Shan Human Rights Foundation (SHRF) and the latter a joint publication by SHRF and Shan Women Action Network (SWAN), in 1998 and 2002 respectively.
But first let us look at the proposed Mong Ton Dam project, which is gearing to start if the government could have its way.

Salween Project and Mong Ton Dam

The blueprints for a hydro-power project on the Salween include a series of dams in Shan State: the 7,100 megawatt Mong Ton Dam; the 1,400 MW Kunlong Dam; the 1,200 MW Nawng Pha Dam; and the 200 MW Mantone Dam. The project would also include plans for a 4,000 MW Ywathit Dam in Karenni State, and the 1,360 MW Hat Gyi Dam in Karen State. Investors in the projects include the China Three Gorges Corporation, a Chinese state-owned firm which operates the world’s largest dam on the Yangtze River. The other foreign firms involved in the Salween project are: Sinohydro; China Southern Grid; and a subsidiary of the state-run Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand.

According to Salween Watch Coalition’s report of March 2016, the “Current Status of Dam Projects on the Salween River,” Mong Ton Dam Project  (Tasang Dam/Mai Tong Dam) is located about 40 kilometers from Ban Arunothai, Chiang Dao District, Chiang Mai, Thailand. Originally, the dam was to be located at Tasang, but as the former project developers was unable to construct the dam in this location, a new project was proposed.

The dam site for the ‘Mai Tong Dam’, as it is known in Burmese, is 10 kilometers along the river from the initial location, closer to Mong Ton Township. The Australian company, Snowy Mountains Engineering Corporation (SMEC) has been commissioned to carry out an Environmental Impact Assessment in Shan State. However the legitimacy and quality of the report has been questioned by a number of civil society organizations in Shan State.

The study team has met with opposition from local villagers in many areas. The study is also far from complete, as part of the study area along the Salween River is under the control of the United Wa State Army (UWSA) and they have refused to give permission to the study team to enter the area.

A major concern is the size of the project: The dam site and reservoir will stretch 870 kilometers along the Salween and Pang Rivers, its main tributary in central Shan State. Local people in the area were forcibly relocated by Burmese government troops in the 90’s, and at least 300,000 people were displaced during this time.  

The projected reservoir size is said to be 640 sq kilometers.

The Protest

Following the 12 August announcement of the National League for Democracy (NLD) government that the hydro power projects on the Salween River will be continued as the country is in need of energy, the 26 Shan Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) sent an open letter on 17 August, demanding to stop the project.

The Committee for Shan State Unity (CSSU) followed suit, on 29 August, issuing a statement, demanding that the project be shelved.

The eight point protest and rejection statement of CSSU mainly underlined the fact that energy won from the hydro-power dams of 15,000 megawatts would be just for export; the NLD government has committed itself to dam the Salween river; the China part of Salween (called Nu river) was suspended due to the fear of earth quake, but pushed for the building of it on Burma, Shan State, side being unreasonable; Burma is a natural disaster prone region, including earth quake, partly due to the exploitation of the natural resources; no transparency according to the international standard in conducting the feasibility studies; pushing big dam projects before constitutional amendments addressing the power and resources sharing could be worked out; and urged the government to review the project which threatened people’s lives, property and homes, and also destroy the ecological system.

The final eight paragraph explicitly warned: “Large dam projects threaten people’s lives, property and homes, and also destroy the ecological system. Just as the government has decided to review and suspend the Myitsone dam, we strongly urge the government to review the dam projects on the Salween river. If the Salween dams go ahead against the wishes of local ethnic communities, we will join with all the ethnic people, civil society groups and environmental groups in opposing the dams.”

The CSSU is comprised of Shan political parties and armed groups, including the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD), the Shan Nationalities Democratic Party (SNDP), the Shan State Progress Party (SSPP) and the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS).

Speaking at the Foreign Correspondents Club of Thailand (FCCT) in the Thai capital recently, Sai Khur Hseng of the Shan Sapawa Environmental Organization and spokesperson for the joint-statement, said that the new Burmese government has tried to implement the hydro-power projects without caring about the suffering of ordinary people.

“While all eyes were on the Irrawaddy- Myitsone dam, Burma has quietly sold off the Salween to China,” said Sai Khur Hseng. “We fear there has been a trade-off.”

Regarding the Mong Ton Dam, Sai Leik, SNLD’s spokesperson and joint-secretary, said that the proposed hydro-power plant is only seen as an export commodity and not in anyway aimed at regional development. As such, the party rejected the dam-building and as well, the Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs) and Social Impact Assessments (SIAs) outcomes, which were in-comprehensive with no transparency.

He elaborated: “When we are still unable to promulgate a constitution that exactly defines the economical distribution, sharing of natural resources and taxation, implementing this kind of project could lead to repetition of more conflict”.

“This would slow down the State Counselor’s peace process. If this project would be pushed through by all means using political pressure, (the government) would have to meet the disapproval and ire of the people. The implementation party would become historical villain and the party that allows it an accomplice,” stressed Sai Leik.

His chairman, Hkun Htun Oo added: “Dam-building on Salween needs to be approved by the concerned state’s people. But if it is done without their consent, national reconciliation would have to wait more longer.”

He also made it plain that failure to stop the project would have a tremendous effect on the well-being of the peace process.

Dispossessed

 The relocation of central Shan State by the then military regime was to deny support base for the Shan United Revolutionary Army (SURA), which later changed its name into RCSS that had regrouped to continue the resistance after the surrender of Khun Sa’s Mong Tai Army (MTA) in 1996.

In process, the Shan population in central Shan State were forcefully relocated near to big towns, where the military could control them for its own security reason and aimed at crushing the Shan resistance.

Shan Human Rights Foundation (SHRF) reported that since 1996, some 300,000 people of over 1,400 villages throughout 7,000 square miles were ordered to move at gunpoint into strategic relocation sites. But reportedly, the 80 percent majority opted to flee to Thailand, while some 20 percent gave in to be relocated and a small amount chose to hide in the jungles.

In 1997, in addition to expanding the area of forced relocation, the regime’s troops also began systematically killing villagers caught outside the relocation sites in a program to deter others from going back to their original villages. Villagers have also been massacred in large groups. This has included those who were given official permission to return to their villages.

On March 30, 1997, Burma Army troops raped and shot dead a girl of 12 while she was taking hay to cattle in a field near her old village of Ho Pung, Lai Kha township. When her relatives requested permission to bury the body, the Burma Army troops said: “She must be kept like this as an example for you people of Shan State to see, if you bury her you must die with her.”  (SHRF June 1997 monthly report)

On July 11, 1997, Burma Army troops laid out the beheaded bodies of 26 villagers beside the main Keng Lom-Kun Hing road in an apparent warning to other villagers straying from the relocation sites. On July 12, a further 12 headless corpses of villagers were placed by the Keng Lom-Keng Tawng road in Kun Hing township.

Throughout 1997, Burma Army troops killed villagers who were simply foraging for food near the relocation sites. Examples include a woman blown up by a grenade when collecting bamboo shoots in a field (May 30, 1997, Kun Hing); 3 men shot dead when fishing in a stream (March 30, 1997, Nam Zarng); and 6 men shot dead when collecting wild honey in the forest (June 6, 1997, Nam Zarng).

Villagers have also been massacred in large groups. This has included those who were given official permission to return to their villages.

For example, on June 16, 1997, two groups of villagers who had been relocated to the town of Kun Hing were given permission to return to their old villages to collect rice. They left in two convoys of ox-carts. Both groups were stopped on the way by Burma Army troops; one near Sai Khao, one near

Tard Pa Ho waterfall. In one group, 29 of the villagers were massacred, in the other 27. One of the survivors, a woman with a small child, who was spared, related the horror of the massacre:

“We were made to stay in a house. . They (the Burma Army troops) came to the door and called out the people one by one. They called away 16 people first, 12 men and 4 women. Then they came and called another group of 10. . . Then to the west I heard bursts of machine gunfire. They were killing the 16 people. Then after just a bit I heard gunfire nearby. . . In the group of 10 my husband died. In the group of 16 my younger sister and her husband died… I was sure I would be killed too..  I was shaking, shaking! I was sitting and shaking all the time. My blood was hot all over my body. I could not think properly. I would have run away but they were standing there guarding me… I think I would be dead if I hadn’t had my son with me. One of the women who was killed had left her baby at home. She squeezed out milk from her breast to show she had a baby, but the SLORC commander said that her baby must have died (and killed her anyway).” (KHRG interview with villager from Keng Kham, August 30, 1997)

The extrajudicial killings also include people who were killed while inside relocation sites. For example, on February 21, 1997, at about 9.00 pm, 2 Shan families, including three young children, were blown up while sheltering in a ditch near their homes by SLORC troops at Kho Lam relocation site in Nam Zarng township. The troops had fired shells into the site in retaliation for a Shan Army raid in the area.

During this two to three years period of relocation, SHRF documented a total conservative estimate of of 664 killed, of which 319 deaths were from Kun Hing, suffering the most out of the nine townships that had faced extra-judicial killings.

License to Rape

The executive summary of the “License to Rape” details 173 incidents of rape and other forms of sexual violence, involving 625 girls and women, committed by Burmese army troops in Shan State, mostly between 1996 and 2001.

The report reveals that the Burmese military regime is allowing its troops systematically and on a widespread scale to commit rape with impunity in order to terrorize and subjugate the ethnic peoples of Shan State. The report illustrates there is a strong case that war crimes and crimes against humanity, in the form of sexual violence, have occurred and continue to occur in Shan State.

The report gives clear evidence that rape is officially condoned as a ‘weapon of war’ against the civilian populations in Shan State. There appears to be a concerted strategy by the Burmese army troops to rape Shan women as part of their anti-insurgency activities. The incidents detailed were committed by soldiers from 52 different battalions. 83% of the rapes were committed by officers, usually in front of their own troops. The rapes involved extreme brutality and often torture such as beating, mutilation and suffocation. 25% of the rapes resulted in death, in some incidences with bodies being deliberately displayed to local communities. 61% were gang-rapes; women were raped within military bases, and in some cases women were detained and raped repeatedly for periods of up to 4 months. Out of the total 173 documented incidents, in only one case was a perpetrator punished by his commanding officer. More commonly, the complainants were fined, detained, tortured or even killed by the military.

The majority of rape incidents were committed in the areas of Central Shan State where over 300,000 villagers have been forcibly relocated from their homes since 1996. Many rapes took place when girls or women were caught, usually searching for food, outside the relocation sites. Rapes also occurred when women were being forced to porter or do other unpaid work for the military, and when stopped at military checkpoints.

Perspective

Having linked the three documentation reports, it could now be concluded that the bone of contention is that while the NLD regime is bent on implementing the Salween dam project solely aimed at exporting the energy won from it, the Shan are determined to resist it, as they consider that they are being unfairly exploited, first by clearing their inhabited areas in the name of anti-insurgency campaign – with the pretext of protecting sovereignty and upholding national unity – and currently, denying their rights of decision-making and administering their own natural resources.

For the directive of hasty implementation decision made by the government while the peace process, to work out power and resources sharing through constitutional rewriting or amendments is still underway, it is in no way an appropriate undertaking just to export the Shan people’s owned resources, won from the devastation of the environment.

Furthermore, the argument is that if the Chinese are not ready to build dams on their side of Nu river, which is the upper part of Salween river, due to the fear of earth quake. The question asked here is, why could it be reasonable that the dams be built in Shan State should be allowed, that is also prone to the earth quake, as evident by what have happened just a few years back, in eastern Shan State.

To sum up the situation, this dam issue is fast becoming a Shan’s “Alamo”, with patience running thin on both sides of the conflict spectrum, as could be seen by the fervent protests of CSSU, the Shan CSOs and the affected public. The Shan sees that this area of central Shan State, which is again about to be devastated for the second time in two decades,  considers this to be their “last political bastion and as well, the Shan people’s national value” that have to be protected by all means. The adversaries should also take heed that this protest might not be limited to just mass protests or civil disobedience, given that the CSSU has two major Shan armies as its members, one non-signatory (SSPP) and the other signatory (RCSS) of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) on 15 October 2015.

Meanwhile, on 1 October, RCSS and Burma Army were engaged in heavy armed clashes in southern Shan State as the latter raided the former’s position, said to be a drug rehabilitation center. It was said to be the third major armed engagement within a year, according to the RCSS sources. At this writing the armed clashes are said to be still in progress.

The non-signatory SSPP and Burma Army has been on war-footing having an on and off armed engagement, even during the peace negotiation phases all throughout these years.

Another similar dissatisfaction over Salween dam project is also brewing in Karen State, as the Burma Army in collaboration with the Karen Border Guard Force were accused – under the pretext of going after the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) splinter group – of trying to encroach into the Karen National Union (KNU) controlled territory of Hat Gyi, where a dam is scheduled to be built.

The KNU commanders were said to be against the project and have made it clear that any territorial violation would be met with decisive military retaliation.

Given such a backdrop, the choice that the powers that be could make is to either repeat and heightened the anti-insurgency campaign by going for an all-out war on the Shan, or suspend the project until an all agreeable constitution that oversees the power and resources sharing that all could live with is worked out. It is entirely up to the regime either to torpedo the nascent peace process or save it, to give peace a chance.