(News Analysis) – Twenty armed groups are now operating in Shan State, 53 years after the Shan started an armed resistance movement against the Burmese regime.

The reasons behind the Shan uprising were essentially the same as other ethnic groups: inequality in political and administrative matters.

It would not be wrong to blame a succession of Burmese leaders for their failure to solve ethnic political conflicts in Burma. Instead of taking political differences to the negotiating table, the military regime is notorious for using threats, force and military might to coerce ethnic opposition groups to bow to its wishes.

Few ethnic groups were spared in the era of General Ne Win, after he staged a military coup in 1962. Ne Win came into power under the pretext of saving the union of Burma from breaking up into autonomous ethnic regions.

The Shan were no different from other ethnic groups who took up arms to fight for political equality based on the promises of the Panglong Agreement, signed in 1947, which assigned ethnic groups full equality and the authority to manage their own affairs.

The Shan State leaders were patient with the new Burmese government even after they felt they had been betrayed by the agreement . When ethnic leaders finally gave up on the agreement, Shan leaders asked for a reformation of Burma based along the principles of the agreement. Regrettably, their call for a federal government failed, and it wasn’t long before the Burmese leaders branded all ethnic political groups as separatists.

In fact, the Shan, Chin and Kachin have every right to demand independence, self-determination and full autonomy, as promised in the agreement.

On May 21, 1958, a Shan leader, Sao Noi aka Saw Yan Tha, was the first Shan to take up arms against the Burmese regime. News of his armed resistance group immediately spread throughout the state. Thousands of Shan grabbed their weapons in an attempt to push the regime from their land. In their hearts, they also desired revenge against the heavy-handed oppression of the Burmese troops.

Since then, thousands of Shan have sacrificed their lives for the cause.

However, in wasn’t long before Shan opposition groups began to split apart due to different political visions. Some Shan leaders followed the Communist ideology while others believed in democratic principles. On several occasions, the Shan even took up arms against each other.

For many years, the drug lord Khun Sa and his Mong Tai Army was the largest Shan resistance force and the greatest threat to the Ne Win government.

In late 1995, however, Khun Sa and a faction of his army surrendered to the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC). The surrender was due to the break-up of his Mong Tai Army, when Major Sao Gun Yawd separated from Khun Sa over the issue of how the Shan were treated by the Chinese officers who dominated the Mong Tai Army. At the same time, Chinese businessmen began to gain greater influence.

When Sao Gun Yawd broke away, more than 15,000 Shan fighters, following Khun Sa, surrendered to the regime in 1995. Sao Gun Yawd formed the Shan State Nationalities Army (SSNA) after he parted ways with Khun Sa. However, in 2004, Sao Gun Yawd died as negotiations for a cease-fire agreement were underway. In 2005, the group came under pressure to surrender. As a result, its leader, Sao Sai Yee, decided to rejoin the Shan army led by Sao Yawd Serk, which is based along the Shan-Thai border.

Since then, a string of militias groups have been formed, and many have fallen under the control of the Burmese regime. Surprisingly, the regime has not confiscated their weapons but allowed the soldiers to hold on their guns, giving them the power to dominate various areas and establish business fiefdoms. In fact, when needed the regime often tries to play the militia groups against one another.

Over the years, various militia and cease-fire groups have surrendered to the regime, entering the ‘legal fold’. Generally, the regime has allowed them to do whatever businesses they want––including dealing in drugs. Various groups have been given business concessions in a cosy relationship with local Burmese commanders. As a result, many of the armed groups have lost their original political goals.

Since 2009, various cease-fire groups have agreed to transform into militia groups and become members of the regime’s Border Guard Force (BGF), largely due to pressure from Burmese commanders. Some groups remain nominally as cease-fire groups, such as the United Wa State Army (UWSA), the National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA) and the 1st Brigade of the Shan State Army -North (SSA-N).

While it’s difficult to get an exact count and description of each Shan armed group, there are about 11 militia groups and four cease-fire groups in some semblance of cooperation with the Burmese regime.

On the other hand, the Shan State Army – South (SSA-S) and three smaller armed opposition groups continue to fight against the Burmese regime.

Judging each group’s political point of view is a difficult task and their views often change based on events.

Observers agree that the regime will not be able to change the political goals of the ethnic armed opposition groups by using force, and national reconciliation can only come if and when the regime decides to engage in real political dialogue.