The recent pressure being leveled against the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) by the Burmese junta follows a period of relatively smooth relations. Unlike some other armed ethnic groups, KIO leaders have continually sought to avoid confrontation with the Burmese military since accepting a ceasefire deal in 1994.

Meanwhile, Kachin leaders have groomed a new generation of KIO and civil society young people to continue the goals of the Kachin in a future Burma, envisioning the various generations working together. But, well aware of this strategy, Burmese authorities are attempting to pre-empt Kachin elders from playing a role in the state’s political developments.

The Kachin people, having never been won over by the Burmese junta, are prepared to support state governance under the administration of the KIO and its antecedents.

The regime’s approach of confronting armed ethnic groups such as the KIO came about as a means to defuse domestic pressure mounting from Aung San Suu Kyi and her National League for Democracy (NLD) in the early 1990s. Specifically, a policy of “divide and rule” adopted from the British colonial administration was employed to drive a wedge between the democratic movement, led by Suu Kyi, and armed ethnic groups.

Kachin leaders felt junta representative Khin Nyunt, who oversaw the ceasefire initiatives, could understand the demands of ethnic peoples, even though the former intelligence chief never promised any type of federal system or separation of powers for the states. Instead, pressure was placed on the Kachin and others to work within the framework of the National Convention, a critical component of the regime’s political “Road Map”.

However, things started to go drastically wrong from the ethnic ceasefire groups’ perspective after Khin Nyunt was purged in 2004, when they lost a critical line of direct access to the country’s political decision-making matrix. Instead, communication between ceasefire parties and the government was demoted to state and local levels. The national government concerned itself solely with the provision of commercial benefits. Ethnic leaders were left to wait and see regarding the future of any political developments.

Accordingly, ceasefire groups had hoped this year’s general election would provide an alternative means by which to deal with political matters, including possible statehood. But facing stringent restraints in the areas of time, resources and electoral laws, the junta has had an easy go of recruiting Kachins and others to back government-supported parties and marginalize the political clout of the KIO and like-minded outfits.

The uncertainty surrounding relations with Naypyidaw has led many ethnic leaders along the Sino-Burmese border to seek Chinese assistance, requesting the presence of Chinese leaders at the border in the hope of convincing Beijing and Kunming authorities to support the desires of Burma’s ethnic communities. However, it has been a difficult sell, as ethnic leaders are well aware of China’s entrenched national interests in the Burmese state.

China, for its part, also experienced the effects of 30,000 refugees flooding into the country from Burma in the wake of last year’s Burmese military offensive in the Kokang Region. Beijing is thus quite reluctant to give the go-ahead to Burmese officials for attacking the KIO and other ethnic forces operating along their shared border.

The bottom line is that China will not tolerate instability in Burma. As such, China will only have more problems if the Burmese regime moves against the KIO and other ceasefire groups; a predicament only compounded with the probable involvement of international organizations, including humanitarian and religious groups.

“A major offensive against the KIO … is very unlikely,” a source close to the Chinese government said. “China will not allow any civil war along the border with Yunnan province.”

Instead, observers assess current military maneuvering on the part of the Burmese regime as an attempt to pressure Beijing to convince ethnic ceasefire groups to accept the regime’s Border Guard Force proposal.

With both Naypyidaw and ethnic forces lobbying Chinese officials for political backing, one source concluded “neither would get any concrete assurance from Beijing, with Beijing only encouraging talks and a peaceful solution”.

Either way, the Burmese regime is confronting the realization that it has lost its ability to control political influence in Kachin state and other ethnic areas straddling the Chinese border.

Nyo Ohn Myint is Chairman of the National League for Democracy (Liberated Area) Foreign Affairs committee, based in Thailand.