Suu Kyi needs new alliances with the ‘third force’ in Burma

Suu Kyi needs new alliances with the ‘third force’ in Burma
by -
Banya Hongsar

Burma’s people hope  Aung San Suu Kyi will be released on the 13th of November, as announced by the ruling military government,....

Burma’s people hope  Aung San Suu Kyi will be released on the 13th of November, as announced by the ruling military government, after being in long-term house arrest in Burma for over 15 of the past 20 years . This is good news for Burmese citizens.

Daw Aung San Suu Kyi (aka) Daw Suu, as she is respectfully called in the Burmese language, needs new allies among the ‘third force’, the united force of 12 ethnic nationalities led by the United Nationalities Alliance (UNA), who together contested and won a total of 67 seats in the 1990 Burmese elections. Daw Suu has a second chance to cultivate a new political strategy, and building an alliance with this third force, the ethnic political leaders and their armed forces, would give her a balanced strategy for dealing with Burma’s ruling generals. However, this strategy may not be popular among her senior colleagues from the National League for Democracy (NLD), especially those who have strong links with the Burmese army from military careers. This is a test for Daw Suu , as to whether she will foster greater alliances with the third force in pursuit of mobilizing her mission to become head of the Burmese state.

What has been amiss in Daw Suu’s campaigns over the last twenty years is her party’s long-standing disinterest in forming an alliance with the third force, either formally or informally. The exception was the release of a joint statement with ethnic leaders in 1989, in Rangoon, saying that Burma will one day form a democratic nation that respects the equal rights of all citizens including ethnic nationalities. The so-called Bo Aung Kyaw Street Declaration of 1990, in which the NLD agreed in theory to support a federal union of Burma, has been ineffective because the NLD has little energy to foster campaigns that satisfy the grief of the country’s ethnic people, who have been oppressed by the Burmese government’s policies for half a century. Daw Suu also needs to cut ties with her senior colleagues, those who play politics with her in appeasing the ruling junta for national reconciliation, without honoring the outcome of the general election in 1990, in which her party won 86% of the primary vote.

It is Daw Suu who could foster unity among ethnic people, much like her father, General Aung San. He broke the deadlock between Burman and non-Burman leaders in 1947 by singing the Unity Accord in Shan State prior to gaining Burma’s independence. Daw Suu’s father, the honorable Aung San, Deputy Chairman of the Governor’s Executive Council, ruled in the Constitutional Assembly on June 16th, 1947 , that the future Constitution of Burma should be that of an Independent Sovereign Republic, known as the “Union of Burma”, and that the constitution should provide adequate safeguards for minorities. It is only Daw Suu who has had the courage to confront the ruling generals over the last twenty years while other politicians were silent. It is Daw Suu who brought attention to Burma from all over the world, and said that we, the Burmese people, are the prisoners of our own country. It is Daw Suu who challenged the ruling generals to go back to the military barracks and become the army of the people instead of the enemy of the people.
Ethnic leaders also need a second chance to deal with the ruling generals in the post election period. Ethnic leaders may not receive world support for their discourse unless they build a mature alliance with Daw Suu and her party during the transition to democracy in the country. The National Democratic Front, an umbrella organization of all ethnic armed forces, and the Democratic Alliance of Burma, another umbrella organization of ethnic and Burmese democratic forces, spent over twenty years fighting for democratic change, but failed to bring about their desired outcome. Now, the leaders of these alliances must foster fruitful relations with Daw Suu and her party, to increase pressure on the ruling generals for tripartite dialogue, in due course. The newly formed Ethnic Nationalities Council, based in liberated areas and in exile, has to play a key role and become a liaison that all Burma democratic forces trust.

Daw Suu will be released after the election, but she cannot foster a new campaign unless ethnic leaders back her in a challenge to the outcome of the upcoming election, and a declaration that the new government does not represent the will of the people under democratic principles. On the other hand, ethnic leaders also must support her call to pressure the new government for a dialogue with her and ethnic representatives.

Both the NLD and ethnic leaders alike have attempted to bring change to Burma without each other’s support. Leaders of representatives of ethnic armed groups and democratic forces held a drafting of a federal constitution of the Union of Burma in April 2005. Finally, the drafting process was completed in April 2006, after a Federal Seminar held that same month in liberated areas with representatives of ethnic groups and democratic forces, including the Burmese Women’s Union. The ninety representatives completed a draft of the constitution of Burma and released it to the public in print. Ethnic leaders expected that Daw Suu would review this drafted constitution, and publicly support this document to further foster the unity of the Burmese and non-Burmese ethnic people. However, Daw Suu and her senior colleagues have paid little attention to the document. Instead the NLD claimed that only its own model could bring durable political settlement in the country. The two groups were at an impasse. Then, the ruling military junta publicly called a referendum on its own model in May 2008, and approved it without public debate.

The NLD released a special statement on March 31, 2008, that urged the people in the entire country to review the SPDC’s new constitution, and determine whether it guaranteed the basic civil rights of the citizens under its laws. The statement was released in Burmese by the Central Committee from NLD party headquarters. The NLD also released another statement on April 2nd, 2008, also in Burmese, urging all people in the country to boycott the constitutional referendum. The party had written its own draft of a Burmese constitution in early 1990, prior to the elections that year, but the public never had the opportunity to either view or debate this document nationally.

The NLD has been operating without its leader, Daw Suu, for the majority of the past two decades. However, the party maintains its core mission of bringing about democratic change in Burma through popular public support. The NLD again released an official statement under the name of the Shwegondaing Declaration on April 29, 2009. The declaration outlined the NLD’s position and concludes with “the National League for Democracy, through this Shwegondaing Declaration, states that, anticipating for the realization of the benefit of the whole people, it intends to participate in the elections only after gravely considering as a special case and after studying the coming Party Registration Act and the laws relating to the elections”. The party’s position seems to show willingness to compromise with the ruling generals, provided there is room to move towards further constitutional change.

The ethnic leaders and their forces have debated over whether to participate in or boycott the upcoming elections. The ethnic leaders based in liberated areas released their own model of a ‘road map’, the so called ‘Transition Towards Democracy & Development in Burma – Action Plan’ issued by the Democracy & Ethnic Movement of Burma. The consultation paper is signed by Khun Mahn Ko Barn, Minister of Federal and Ethnic Affairs of the National Coalition Government of The Union of Burma (NCGUB). However, this 24-page document did not appeal to the general Burmese populace, and the Burmese government launched a counter-attack to silence the ethnic leaders’ voices in the national media. The ethnic leaders formed another umbrella organization under the name of the ‘United Nationalities League for Democracy (UNLD) – liberated area’ in late 2000, and began to pursue a strategy of international advocacy. Elected leaders from the ethnic parties later fled the country for security reasons, and then formed satellites of this umbrella organization on the Burma-Thailand and Burma-India borders.

Leaders from the NLD and ethnic forces have been attempting to earn the support of the US and EU governments for over twenty years. The UN tried to use its resources and avenues to encourage the ruling military junta to seek national dialogue and reconciliation. These attempts have failed to either pressure or convince the ruling generals.

Daw Suu and the NLD need the ethnic leaders’ support, just as the ethnic forces need Daw Suu’s forces. Daw Suu and her senior colleagues should be aware that the ethnic people are seeking constitutional rights under a framework of self-determination. The urban Burmese only protested against the ruling socialist government in 1988 when the country had nearly collapsed under corruption and mismanagement. However, the ethnic people have been fighting for basic civil rights since 1948, soon after Burma gained independence.

Sixteen years ago, a senior writer from the New Yorker magazine visited Burma, and produced a lengthy report on the country, focusing on Daw Suu’s path to power. Amitav Ghosh wrote under the title , ‘At Large in Burma’, in August 1996, where contended Aung San Suu Kyi is the one figure in Burma who has sufficient popular support, both among ethnic Burmans and among many minorities, to start a process of national reconciliation. But even Suu Kyi might find it difficult to alter historical border disputes. In the event of a total military withdrawal, it is possible that some insurgent groups might attempt to reclaim the territories they once controlled. A rekindling of the insurgencies would almost certainly lead to a rapid erosion of Suu Kyi’s popular support. This assertion cautioned Daw Suu when dealing with ethnic armed groups. However, a fresh strategy for all ethnic leaders and Daw Suu could mend this tension when a new alliance is formed in due course.
This is a new era in Burma’s political landscape. The ruling generals and its newly formed political party will dominate the government after the 2010 elections. Daw Suu and her party cannot pressure the military’s new party without the concrete support of ethnic leaders and their armed forces. A collaboration between these two groups will create a win-win position for all stakeholders in Burma’s political crisis.

In brief, Daw Suu is Burma’s hope, and this hope should be envisioned by all leaders of the ethnic forces. Daw Suu will not live another fifty years, but she will be fostering democratic change in the next ten or twenty years. She deserves great support from ethnic leaders and their armed forces for her vision and courage. The world did not pay attention to Burma until Daw Suu spoke out in 1988. Likewise, the world will not pay much attention to Burma if her voice is not heard in the country’s national politics. This is Daw Suu’s second chance to walk into the prime minister’s  seat, with the cohesive support of her own party, as well as ethnic leaders and newly formed democratic forces.

This is Burma’s true road to democracy: one that equally represents the voices of the third forces, in a national government that operates under the principle of pragmatism and realism.