Since the year 2000 the Burmese Army has been conducting a series of war games codenamed Sun Ye (Swooping Kite), ostensibly to defend Burma against foreign invasions, but in reality, according to the Network for Democracy and Development (NDD), to fight against the country’s non-Burma ethnic armed groups demanding more autonomy for their people.
The final plan to flush out the 17 ceasefire groups was in fact approved at the second tri-annual meeting in Rangoon in August 2004, according to one of its reports.
Since then four ceasefire groups have been either eliminated or forced to surrender:
- Palaung State Liberation Army (PSLA) and Shan State National Army (SSNA) in 2005
- Shan State Nationalities People’s Liberation Front (SNPLO) in 2007
- Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), better known as the Kokang Army, last August
Among the remaining ceasefire groups, the strongest appears to be the United Wa State Army (UWSA) with a reported strength of 25,000 to 35,000 plus 40,000 militia members. Ranged against them is the 492,000 strong Burmese Army, reputedly the second largest land force in Southeast Asia.
But have both the Wa and the Burmese Army got their numbers right? Reports coming from inside Burma seem to be in the negative.
The Lashio-based tri-annual intelligence report by the Northeastern Region Command, dated 24 February 2009, says the 46 infantry battalions, 8 supporting battalions, 11 artillery battalions, 1 tank battalion and 1 armoured battalion under its command were facing just 4,349 strong UWSA:
- Main Wa bases in Panghsang and Pangwai 497
- Artillery Brigade in Panghsang 860
- 318th Brigade in the north 1,496
- 418th Brigade in the west 1,496
The UWSA’s other brigades: 468, 772, 775, 778, 518 and 248 are not counted as they are outside the Northeastern Region Command’s operational areas. But if the 1,496 per brigade figure is taken for granted, the total strength could be no more than 13,325. The actual strength is more likely to be less as the 5 brigades along the Thai-Burma border: 772, 775, 778, 518 and 248 are all under strength.
Fortunately for the Wa, the Burmese Army, according to insider reports, is also way below its doctrinal strength.
During the October 2005 tri-annual meeting, Gen Thein Sein, then Adjutant General, reported that 284 infantry battalions had less than 200 men and 220 others were between 200 and 300.
A few months ago, SHAN received a report that the combat strength for each infantry battalion was fixed at 156.
However, the actual combat strength in the field today is only between 60 to 120 per battalion, according to a ceasefire army’s report.
This seems to be supported by Thein Sein, who was quoted in the 2005 report as saying, “It is easier to find a new weapon than to find a new recruit.”
Appropriately, the outcome of the upcoming conflict (if there is going to be a conflict) between the Burma Army and the UWSA is likely to be decided more by firepower than manpower, apart from fighting abilities.
Which may be easier said than done for both the Burmese Army and the UWSA’s northern forces located along the Sino-Burma border. But not for the 5 brigades along the Thai-Burma border, struggling under a border blockade by the Thai and Burmese Army forces, all of which are finding it difficult to make huge purchases of weapons and ammunition.
Tainted by its heavy involvement in drugs, the 171st Military Region, as the UWSA’s southern brigades are collectively known, the group may be forced to surrender or retreat into Thai territory to be disarmed when their guns are empty, not unlike their Kokang ally in August.
One can only hope as the October deadline is drawing to a close that both the Burmese Army and the UWSA don’t come to call each other’s bluff.
