Take calculated risks. That is quite different from being rash.
General George S.Patton (1885-1945)
“Please take a chance on the NCA (Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement signed by 8 of the 21 recognized Ethnic Armed Organizations). Please take a chance on the (Union Peace) Conference (aka 21st Century Panglong),” State Counselor Aung San Suu Kyi had urged top non-signatory EAO leaders who came to meet her on 17 July, using the phrase “calculated risk” no less than 7 times.
The reason why she is right where she is now, as she told them, is because she had herself taken just that: a calculated risk, the word meaning, according to Cambridge, one that you consider worth taking, because the result, if it is successful, will be so good.
The Business Dictionary, however, has a rather different definition: A chance of exposure to loss or injury that might be undertaken after its advantages and disadvantages have been carefully weighted and considered.
“Had this particular government official given assurances of 100% success, I wouldn’t have taken a chance on the 2012 by elections,” she informed the leaders. “But he on the contrary had suggested taking a calculated risk, which made me think it over and revise my plans. Now I would urge you to do the same.”
Since the meeting, the EAOs, both signatories and non-signatories, have met twice to consider her advice. Two of which have declared attending the UPC#2 aka 21st Century Panglong: United Wa State Army (UWSA) and the National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA). On the other hand, Naypyitaw has so far failed to reach a compromised press release acceptable to both sides with 3 EAOs: Arakan Army (AA), Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) and Ta-ang National Liberation Army (TNLA). And the rest led by the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) continue to negotiate with the government at the time of this reporting on how they can join the UPC.
But, according to the reports coming out of the meetings held last week in Chiangmai, the EAOs now exert less leverage than they did during the tenure of the Thein Sein government (2011-16). “In those days, we had an almost level playing field, because the government was facing a crucial legitimacy issue,” one participant commented. “And if there was a fight, few found fault with us. Now things are different.”
The NLD, at least in the eyes of the democratic world outside, they reasoned, doesn’t have any legitimacy issue.
“Now it seems we may have to beg for everything we want from it, despite the fact that both have since early days adopted democracy and federalism as their avowed aims.”
One other participant suggested, “Maybe the government now needs the Tatmadaw (military) more than us (EAOs).”
So are the EAOs, especially those who have signed the NCA, at the mercy of the NLD-cum-military regime? Should they choose to be satisfied with whatever the government is ready to hand out?
No, the meeting concluded. They still have the NCA which was signed by the President and the Commander-in-Chief, and ratified by the Union Legislature. Therefore, as long as both the government and the military (plus the EAOs) swear by it, a chance, however slim it may seem now, still exists. And the balance, depending on how proactive the EAOs are, may change in their favor.
As Sun Zi of the Art of War said:
To see victory only when it is within the ken of the common herd is not the acme of excellence
Being able to lift a hair isn’t a sign of great strength
Being able to see the sun and moon of having sharp eyes
Being able to hear a thunderclap of having quick ears
But at least one thing is certain:
We will all know by 31 August how many EAOs have taken calculated risk.
