Burma's Peace Process: Some lessons from Chinese history

Burma's Peace Process: Some lessons from Chinese history
by -
S.H.A.N

As the Laiza summit (30 October-1 November) that has invited top leaders of Burma's multi-resistance movements, draws near, two different approaches toward Naypyitaw's offer for Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement became quite clear among these groups that have fought for so long against Burmese domination:

•    One that is willing to take risks
•    The other that is not

The first approach is led by the Karen National Union (KNU) and the second by the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO). Naturally, the two sides are more or less openly engaged in, what Shans call, a "war of saliva" against each other.

It was the same thing that happened during the 1950s when the 10 year trial period of cooperation between Burma and the non-Burman states drew to a close. A bitter war of saliva was the order of the day between secessionists and unionists, prompting Tun Myint Taunggyi, Shans' foremost political analyst-writer, to bring them to mind:

Among the Pro-Unionists, there may be found two categories:

1.    Those who wish to remain because of self-interest, and
2.    Those who sincerely believe that it is in the interests of the people of their states to remain in the Union.

Similarly, corresponding categories in the opposite camp may be found:

1.    Those who wish to secede due to lack or loss of private interests in the Union, and
2.    Those who sincerely believe that only through secession, will progress and prosperity be worked out for the Shan people.

The non-risk takers, of course, have solid arguments to back their distrust of the Thein Sein - Min Aung Hlaing coalition:

•    For more than 60 years beginning with Panglong, non-Burmans (now even Burmans themselves) have been suckers to successive government-military trickeries and broken promises
•    Even groups that have signed ceasefire are being hunted and attacked
•    Some of them have yet to see the draft Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement, let alone to sign it

As most of the leaders today were born during the heydays of communism, particularly the Maoist brand, it wouldn't hurt to cast their minds back to the 1937-1946 period when the ruling Kuomintang Party and the Communist Party of China (CPC) agreed to a ceasefire to fight against Japanese aggression.

One prominent fact that should strike the leaders should be that the CPC was not issuing demands only, but also concessions:

Demands

•    To end civil war
•    To guarantee freedom of speech, press and assembly, and to release political prisoners
•    To invoke a national plan of resistance to Japanese aggression
•    To return to the Three Principles of the People (Nationalism, Livelihood and Democracy) of Dr Sun Yat-sen (1866-1925), the founder of the Republic of China

In return for acceptance of the CPC demands by the Kuomintang, "the Communists stated that they were prepared," wrote Edgar Snow, "to suspend all attempts to overthrow the government and to adopt the following policies:

•    Change the name of the Red Army to "National Revolutionary Army" and place it under the command of the Military Affairs Commission chaired by Kuomintang leader Chiang Kai-shek
•    Change the name of the communist government to "Special Area Government of the Republic of China"
•    Realize a "completely democratic" (representative) form of government within the communist-dominated districts
•    Suspend the policy of land confiscation and concentrate the efforts of the people on the tasks of national resistance against Japan

The second interesting details were the gains emanated from the ceasefire, some of which are the following:

•    A certain degree of liberalization and tolerance in Nanjing (China's former capital)'s internal policies
•    A partial release of the communist districts from their long isolation
•    Students coming to attend the rebels' "Anti-Japanese University”
•    Extension of communist influence inside Kuomintang controlled areas
•    Payment for the communist army from Nanjing
•    Participation in Kuomintang dominated People's Congress
•    Lifting of economic blockade

The third significant fact is that neither side had placed much weight on trust building like we do here these days:

•    The KMT was improving its military positions around communist areas, employing political and economic tactics to weaken them and demand surrender when the time became right
•    The CPC led by Mao Zedong, on the other hand, had entertained no delusions on the ceasefire either. “No party of dictatorship in history ever yielded up its power except under the heaviest pressure, and the Kuomintang would prove no exception." (P.405, Red Star Over China) They did not trust it, but they believed they understood it and would be able to work with it until "the barriers of history broke down, the mighty catastrophe bred by imperialism was set loose, Frankenstein-like, to destroy imperialism, and le deluge swept forward."

And we all know who won in the end.

SHAN therefore hopes the upcoming "Summit" will be able glean precious lessons out of the history of the Chinese revolution in order to come up with a comprehensive agreement for peace acceptable to all stakeholders.