The signed seven-point agreement by the two adversaries in the Kachin state capital of Myitkyina is seen as an effort to end nearly two years of fighting, which would eventually lead to an incremental step of a cease-fire, rather than a breakthrough. The KIO/KIA has all throughout insisted on a political settlement, than just a cease-fire agreement.

Ideally, all the jigsaw puzzles would have fallen into place if the government have been able to secure a cease-fire deal with the Kachin, which the government claims to be the last remaining group to ink the cease-fire agreement.

It is understandable that the government is eager to present and portray its achievement to the international community that all non-Burman, ethnic warring groups have responded to its peace initiative and thus, the remaining sanction obstacles should not only be waived but completely lifted, accelerating international aids and fostering investment climate even further.

To date, the thirteen ethnic resistance armies have responded to the government peace initiative and signed cease-fire deals, but still armed clashes between the Burma Army and both the Restoration Council of Shan State/Shan State Army (RCSS/SSA) and Shan State Progress Party/Shan State Army (SSPP/SSA) have been ongoing. All offensives started out by the Burma Army have been occurring on and off according to its liking and desire, reaching more than one hundred armed engagements within the time span of one year. Technically speaking, in normal circumstances, one would have assumed that the cease-fire has broken down. Ironically, the RCSS/SSA has signed a cease-fire at the end of 2011 and the SSPP/SSA in the early 2012.

Despite cease-fire agreement, under the motto of “area cleansing and control”, the Burma Army has been practically at war with all the non-Burman ethnic nationalities with varying degree of intensities. But the bulk of the Burma Army battalions are stationed in Kachin, Shan and Karen States, where ethnic armed resistance are the most intense. Roughly Burma Army has 492,000 active duty personnel and about sixty percent of its units are said to be stationed in Kachin and Shan States.

According to SHAN report on 02 May 2013, most of the Burma Army Light Infantry Divisions (LIDs) and Military Operations Commands (MOCs), the backbone of Ministry of Defence (Army), are now in frontlines positioning themselves in the ethnic armed group areas, said U Aung Kyaw Zaw, a Sino-Burmese border military and political observer.

“The Burma Army is made up of over 500 infantry battalions. The10 LIDs: 11, 22, 33, 44, 55, 66, 77, 88, 99 and 101 and 21 Military Operations Commands (MOCs): #1 – #21 constitutes the backbone of the military. Except for LIDs 66 and 77, all of those divisions and MOCs are now positioned in ethnic armed group areas. There are few reserve units in the rear,” said the observer.

With the exception of KIO/KIA, most of the rest of ethnic armed groups have signed initial cease-fire but still need to work out a permanent and durable ceasefire.

“In fact, the preliminary cease-fire is only an initial starting point. None of the armed group has signed the permanent final agreement. For a stable and workable agreement, it is required to specify areas for each group. As the demarcation of areas is especially required, the Burma Army is attempting to take hold of larger areas under their control while limiting those of armed groups. This is the only reason that the Burma Army is reinforcing its units in the ethnic armed group areas as much as possible,” the observer said.

The recent escalation of armed conflict, during the last two months, in Shan State against the SSPP/SSA and RCSS/SSA, after a relative tone down of Burma Army’s offensive against the KIO/KIA, is the case in point that signing cease-fire agreement with the government is not bringing the adversaries anywhere near to peaceful political settlement and just proved to be a useless task.

No wonder, the KIO/KIA is sceptical of the cease-fire deal and continues to stick to its political settlement priority as a basis to achieve durable ceasefire arrangement.

Lt-Gen Myint Soe, who commands the Bureau of Special Operations-1, which oversees military operations in Kachin State, was reportedly vested with full authority to negotiate by Snr-Gen Min Aung Hlaing, commander-in-chief of the armed forces. He was in an upbeat mood at the beginning of the meeting with KIO/KIA, where he told the participants of the meeting that he is committed to achieve a cease-fire agreement with the Kachin.

In a report published by Eleven online news on Thursday, 30 May 2013, Lt-Gen Myint Soe said that the Burma Army will place the interest of the people above the need of the armed forces in order to ensure a smooth transition during this ongoing reform process.  

“The people’s desire is a vital role in today’s democratic path. The army will be also be the same as the people’s desire”, said Lt-Gen Myint Soe, adding that the army is perfectly willing to do its best for the restoration of peace and tranquillity in Kachin State.

Meanwhile, VOA on 31 May 2013 reported, U Aung Min, chief negotiator of President Thein Sein said that he would take out the name of KIO/KIA from the list of unlawful organizations, which could further foster confidence-building.

If the Burma Army and as well, Thein Sein government is really sincere to achieve peace and reconciliation in the course of democratization process, there are few crucial steps that need to be taken, to show that it really means business.

In concrete terms, the government must first tackle the unlawful association act, to pave way for ethnic political and resistance groups’ freedom of speech and association, followed by the withdrawal of all Burma Army frontline units back to their mother bases, declaration of nation-wide ceasefire, and a time frame to hold all-inclusive political dialogue, along the line of 1948 Panglong Agreement.

It wouldn’t do just to call for an all-inclusive dialogue without incorporating all the other core issues mentioned above. Otherwise, the government will not be able to climb out from its “ethnocentric, Burman supremacy position pit”, even though the all-inclusive dialogue is meant to pave way for equitable power-sharing and peaceful co-habitation, which is at the heart of the non-Burman ethnic nationalities’ aspiration and demand.

The contributor is the General Secretary of Shan Democratic Union (SDU) - Editor