Pro Thein Sein think tank places blame on KIO for ongoing conflicts

Pro Thein Sein think tank places blame on KIO for ongoing conflicts
by -
KNG

Brussels based think tank stated that the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) “is not blameless” for the ongoing and increasingly bloody Kachin conflict.

The International Crisis Group (ICG) South East Asia Project Director Jim Della-Giacoma claims on a Jan.10 blog posting on their website that the KIO “has not reciprocated the President’s announcement of a unilateral ceasefire and has continued offensive actions against military and strategic targets.”

Like much of what the ICG has written about the Kachin conflict, Della-Giacoma's assessment is misleading. Although President Thein Sein has publicly ordered the military to halt its offensive against the KIO on two occasions, since the conflict began, the army is still attacking KIO positions. This leaves observers to speculate that either Thein Sein isn’t serious about ending the fighting, or he’s lost control of the military. Based on this – and a major point that Della-Giacoma has failed to address - is how can the KIO reciprocate a non-existent “unilateral cease-fire” ?

The author’s blog posting also avoids directly criticizing Thein Sein. It’s not surprising given that last October the ICG announced that the ex-general, who ranked 4th in the previous military regime, would be receiving the ICG's Pursuit of Peace award. An ICG press release sent out last year announcing the award, stated that since coming to office Thein Sein “has made vast strides in ending the decades-long conflict affecting Myanmar”.  The assessment completely ignores the fact that the Burma army unilaterally ended a 17-year ceasefire with the KIO on June 9, 2011, only 3 months after “reformist” Thein Sein became president.

Since the conflict started, the ICG, which receives annual funding from Chevron - a US based oil firm with extensive business interests in Burma - has repeatedly downplayed the Burma's government responsibility in ending the fighting while at the same time heaping the blame on the KIO.

In the New York Times last March, ICG President Louise Arbour wrote that under Thein Sein's leadership the government “has abandoned policies of confrontation with the country’s ethnic minorities for a new peace initiative that has seen 11 cease-fire agreements signed with armed groups, leaving out only the resistant Kachin.”

The fact that Arbour who is a former Canadian Supreme Court Judge declined to name the KIO - implying that the entire Kachin people are insurgents - isn’t the only thing misleading about this article. The recently signed ceasefires with 11 ethnic armed groups may seem significant but the ICG president failed to mention that several of these ceasefires are with small groups such as the Chin National Front (CNF), the Pa-O National Liberation Organization (PNLO) and New Mon State Party (NMSP) and were already engaged in informal ceasefires with the army prior to last year's cease-fire signing ceremonies. While ceasefires signed with both Karen National Union (KNU) and the Shan State Army South (SSA South) can be considered significant changes for eastern Burma, it is difficult to imagine how the army could have been able to successfully fight both of these groups that are based along the Thai-Burma border while carrying a full scale attack on the KIO in country’s northmostwestern state.

Despite ICG's repeated attempts to portray Thein Sein as a man of peace - including awarding him the farcical peace prize -  during his presidency the country has experienced some of the heaviest fighting in decades.  Another overlooked, yet significant fact, ignored in both Arbour and Della-Giacoma’s articles.

In Della-Giacoma’s blog posting, he claims that the way KIO handled the most recent round of peace talks with the government undermined the position of Thein Sein's chief negotiator Aung Min. According to the blog posting: “at peace talks on 30 October, the Myanmar military sent senior commanders to participate, but the Kachin sent only lower-level representatives, meaning that military discussions on separation of forces could not be held. It was interpreted as a snub by the military and left government negotiator U Aung Min undermined as he had worked hard to convince the army to send a very senior army commander to attend the talks in China only for him to be stood up.”

Dell-Giacoma's musing on allegations that KIO “undermined” Aung Min ignores several key facts. Most notably, in the weeks leading up to the October peace talks, the KIO's Chief Spokesperson La Nan repeatedly told journalists that the KIO had lost trust in Aung Min because he’d been dishonest keeping earlier promises made that there wouldn’t be more army offensives against KIO positions. But the KIO’s public criticism of Aung Min didn't stop him from making self-serving announcements regarding further peace talks between the two sides; comments clearly directed towards pleasing foreign diplomats and international donors.

“He [Aung Min] knew we wouldn’t come, but kept telling the media about the offer so that everyone would wonder why we rejected it,” said KIO Spokesperson Kumhtat Lah Nan in an article by Irrawaddy magazine in mid-September. The article was referring to Aung Min's public pronouncement that the KIO had been invited to Naypidaw for peace talks.

Given Lah Nan's comments in advance of the talks it’s hardly surprising that the KIO didn't send their top officials to meet Aung Min and the unnamed senior military official, which Dell-Giacoma referred to. The ICG director’s summary of the talks also ignores that these talks took place at the same time the Burma's army was preparing for a siege on the KIO’s Laiza headquarters; clearly contradicting Aung Min's promises that the army would halt such provocations.

According to Dell-Giacoma's blog posting, the ICG is currently working on a report that will go “into greater details on the dynamics sustaining this conflict”. One can only wonder how objective the upcoming report will be considering that the ICG will be hosting a gala dinner for Thein Sein when he receives his peace prize in April.

Pro Thein Sein think tank places blame on KIO for ongoing conflicts

 

Kachin News Group


A Brussels based think tank stated that the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) “is not blameless” for the ongoing and increasingly bloody Kachin conflict.

The International Crisis Group (ICG) South East Asia Project Director Jim Della-Giacoma claims on a Jan.10 blog posting on their website that the KIO “has not reciprocated the President’s announcement of a unilateral ceasefire and has continued offensive actions against military and strategic targets.”

Like much of what the ICG has written about the Kachin conflict, Della-Giacoma's assessment is misleading. Although President Thein Sein has publicly ordered the military to halt its offensive against the KIO on two occasions, since the conflict began, the army is still attacking KIO positions. This leaves observers to speculate that either Thein Sein isn’t serious about ending the fighting, or he’s lost control of the military. Based on this – and a major point that Della-Giacoma has failed to address - is how can the KIO reciprocate a non-existent “unilateral cease-fire” ?

The author’s blog posting also avoids directly criticizing Thein Sein. It’s not surprising given that last October the ICG announced that the ex-general, who ranked 4th in the previous military regime, would be receiving the ICG's Pursuit of Peace award. An ICG press release sent out last year announcing the award, stated that since coming to office Thein Sein “has made vast strides in ending the decades-long conflict affecting Myanmar”.  The assessment completely ignores the fact that the Burma army unilaterally ended a 17-year ceasefire with the KIO on June 9, 2011, only 3 months after “reformist” Thein Sein became president.

Since the conflict started, the ICG, which receives annual funding from Chevron - a US based oil firm with extensive business interests in Burma - has repeatedly downplayed the Burma's government responsibility in ending the fighting while at the same time heaping the blame on the KIO. 

In the New York Times last March, ICG President Louise Arbour wrote that under Thein Sein's leadership the government “has abandoned policies of confrontation with the country’s ethnic minorities for a new peace initiative that has seen 11 cease-fire agreements signed with armed groups, leaving out only the resistant Kachin.”

The fact that Arbour who is a former Canadian Supreme Court Judge declined to name the KIO - implying that the entire Kachin people are insurgents - isn’t the only thing misleading about this article. The recently signed ceasefires with 11 ethnic armed groups may seem significant but the ICG president failed to mention that several of these ceasefires are with small groups such as the Chin National Front (CNF), the Pa-O National Liberation Organization (PNLO) and New Mon State Party (NMSP) and were already engaged in informal ceasefires with the army prior to last year's cease-fire signing ceremonies. While ceasefires signed with both Karen National Union (KNU) and the Shan State Army South (SSA South) can be considered significant changes for eastern Burma, it is difficult to imagine how the army could have been able to successfully fight both of these groups that are based along the Thai-Burma border while carrying a full scale attack on the KIO in country’s northmostwestern state.

 

Despite ICG's repeated attempts to portray Thein Sein as a man of peace - including awarding him the farcical peace prize -  during his presidency the country has experienced some of the heaviest fighting in decades.  Another overlooked, yet significant fact, ignored in both Arbour and Della-Giacoma’s articles.

In Della-Giacoma’s blog posting, he claims that the way KIO handled the most recent round of peace talks with the government undermined the position of Thein Sein's chief negotiator Aung Min. According to the blog posting: “at peace talks on 30 October, the Myanmar military sent senior commanders to participate, but the Kachin sent only lower-level representatives, meaning that military discussions on separation of forces could not be held. It was interpreted as a snub by the military and left government negotiator U Aung Min undermined as he had worked hard to convince the army to send a very senior army commander to attend the talks in China only for him to be stood up.” 

Dell-Giacoma's musing on allegations that KIO “undermined” Aung Min ignores several key facts. Most notably, in the weeks leading up to the October peace talks, the KIO's Chief Spokesperson La Nan repeatedly told journalists that the KIO had lost trust in Aung Min because he’d been dishonest keeping earlier promises made that there wouldn’t be more army offensives against KIO positions. But the KIO’s public criticism of Aung Min didn't stop him from making self-serving announcements regarding further peace talks between the two sides; comments clearly directed towards pleasing foreign diplomats and international donors. 

“He [Aung Min] knew we wouldn’t come, but kept telling the media about the offer so that everyone would wonder why we rejected it,” said KIO Spokesperson Kumhtat Lah Nan in an article by Irrawaddy magazine in mid-September. The article was referring to Aung Min's public pronouncement that the KIO had been invited to Naypidaw for peace talks.

 

Given Lah Nan's comments in advance of the talks it’s hardly surprising that the KIO didn't send their top officials to meet Aung Min and the unnamed senior military official, which Dell-Giacoma referred to. The ICG director’s summary of the talks also ignores that these talks took place at the same time the Burma's army was preparing for a siege on the KIO’s Laiza headquarters; clearly contradicting Aung Min's promises that the army would halt such provocations. 

According to Dell-Giacoma's blog posting, the ICG is currently working on a report that will go “into greater details on the dynamics sustaining this conflict”. One can only wonder how objective the upcoming report will be considering that the ICG will be hosting a gala dinner for Thein Sein when he receives his peace prize in April.