Why has there been an uptick in violence in Shan State? And might there be a glimmer of peace at the end of the tunnel?
These are questions of vital interest to the citizens of Shan State wearied by war.
On the face of it, the armed forces under the Federal Political Negotiation and Consultative Committee (FPNCC) - considered China's proxy - seem to be gaining momentum in pushing the forces of the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS) out of their operational northern area and some of its southern Shan State territories during the first two months of this year.
Six months ago, in early September last year, the RCSS was asking for outside help from Thailand and the USA - to stem the tide of the onslaught on its troops by three FPNCC members.
But its plea went unheard.
The FPNCC which is supposed to be a political alliance is made up of the United Wa State Army (UWSA), National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA), Shan State Progressive Party (SSPP), Kachin Independence Army (KIA), Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) or Kokang and the Arakan Army (AA).
NEW ‘ALLIANCE’
On paper, the FPNCC members have two separate military alliances. One is the National Alliance-Burma (NA-B), which includes the KIA, AA, MNDAA and TNLA. The second is called the Three Brotherhood Alliance, made up of the AA, MNDAA and TNLA, without the KIA.
But a separate military alliance involving the three FPNCC members SSPP, TNLA and UWSA have been collaborating militarily to root out the RCSS from northern Shan State.
This “ad hoc alliance” appears to be operating at the behest of the Chinese government, given that Beijing considers the RCSS close to Thailand and thus allied with the West, viewing this as an obstacle to their geopolitical and business interests in the region.
In assessing loyalties of groups in the region, it is important to note that the KIA, although a FPNCC member, is not considered a “Chinese proxy” because it is Christian and considered “pro-West”.
A Mizzima report of six months ago by this same writer outlined a Yangon-based Chinese embassy official airing such sentiment openly and directly at the RCSS. He reportedly said the RCSS originated from an anti-communist outfit, but in contrast the SSPP was considered “trustworthy” as it supported the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) in the past - a protege of Chinese Communist Party - and thus the RCSS would be evicted from northern Shan State by all means even if the SSPP could not do it alone.
Such an assessment jars with reality. The RCSS has repeatedly denied it was anybody’s “agent” and never received any help from the USA or the West in any real sense.
PUSH SOUTHWARD
As the RCSS foresaw six months ago, it was pushed out from its bases in northern Shan State and is now losing ground in southern Shan State to the two combined forces, SSPP and UWSA, as the TNLA was said not to be involved in the further southward push, according to reliable Shan sources.
In northern Shan State, the RCSS abandoned territories six months ago in Muse District and military bases in Kyaukme District recently.
By the end of 2021, the RCSS had left northern Shan State as it retreated from its stronghold at Hu Hsun, after several months of fighting. Hu Hsun, located in the Loi Mauk hills near the village of Kyu Shaw, had been its northern headquarters since 2015.
In southern Shan State the lost territories are in Loilem District, namely Mong Kung, Lai-Hka, Kyethi (Khesi) townships and Panglong Sub township, and in Taunggyi District it was Lawksauk Township.
Shan news sources and RCSS insiders note that while the RCSS has dismantled many military garrisons and outposts in the north and south of Shan State, many of its members and functionaries are still in the areas, indicating they might be lying low and mingling with the local population as they are recruits from the respective local areas.
INTERACTIONS
The SSPP only joined the fight with the TNLA after 2018 when initially only the RCSS and TNLA were battling each other by the end of 2015, after the former signed the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement
(NCA) in October 2015 under the Union Solidarity and Development Party-led Thein Sein government.
The on-and-off clashes between the two warring groups went on until 2018 when the SSPP also entered the fray, probably because the RCSS was infringing on its claimed territories and also because of the FPNCC consensus in 2016 to counter the RCSS and push it back to the southern Shan State.
The Shan population and the Buddhist Sangha were furious the two ethnic Shan armies, the RCSS and SSPP, were fighting each other and due to their pressure in 2019, a ceasefire was reached but lasted only a year.
Since then, the combined force of the TNLA and SSPP have been fighting the RCSS, with the help of the UWSA and the support of China.
In July 2021, the push to evict RCSS became intense due to Chinese pressure and the military hardware and ammunition that poured in immensely increased the firepower of the SSPP and TNLA combined forces. The UWSA was said to be included in overrunning the RCSS positions in Loi Hun mountain range of Kehsi Township, southern Shan State, not far from the SSPP headquarters Wanhai, northern Shan State.
Both sides have accused each other of colluding with the Myanmar military – and eyebrows were raised that both Shan armies sent representatives to at attend the 75th Union Day on 12 February.
Over the last six months, the RCSS has lost ground in Shan State north and south, and speculation surrounds whether there might soon be an attack on the RCSS headquarters in Loi Tai Leng as reported by a local media and also Asia Times quite recently.
This latest claim may be a result of an accidental clash between the RCSS and UWSA on 5 February, an incident said to have been quietly resolved but not made public.
SSPP GAIN
Uncertainty surrounds the aggressive stance of the SSPP. Generally, the SSPP and UWSA have a long relationship from CPB days when the Wa were part of it and the SSPP part of the pro-CPB alliance. Practically the two having adjacent adjoining territories and have to rely on each other for their security.
While it can be argued where the directive to evict the RCSS comes from - whether they were coming directly from the FPNCC or China directly - opting to implement it has definitely empowered the SSPP and the TNLA militarily, according to keen observers of Shan politics. Within a short span of a few years, both have grown tremendously in accumulation and beefing up of their troops and armaments.
Some keen Shan observers claim the SSPP is just pretending with its “anti-RCSS stance” and going along with the rhetoric to receive military hardware and ammunition to build up its strength as an opportunity, as it abruptly abandoned the 2019 ceasefire with the RCSS and made an about-turn without much credible reason.
But the SSPP also realizes that the Shan population is split into two and Shan unity is seriously at stake, which the bulk of the Shan population bitterly against such divisiveness.
RCSS HUMILIATION
The RCSS military humiliation is due to two factors.
Firstly, is its inability to speedily resupply its troops in northern Shan State from its base in the south at the Thai border, which is hundreds of kilometres away, affecting its troops ability to confront its adversaries with limited firepower.
Secondly, its adversaries have ample firepower, made possible with support from the UWSA and China.
For now, the RCSS is licking its wounds and has been trying to shore up its deficit politically by floating the idea of holding a Shan State Congress in the near future, making it known in a statement on the 75th Shan National Day Anniversary on 7 February.
Parallel to it on the same day, the Shan State Preparatory Meeting (First Stage) was headed and held by the RCSS.
The announcement stated the first stage meeting conference was held virtually from 3 to 7 February, with 93 persons from domestic and foreign Shan Sangha groups, civil society organizations, people from various townships of Shan State, and RCSS council members
It also emphasized that all ethnic groups and all strata of the people of Shan State are welcomed to help realize the goal of holding a Shan State Congress. The ultimate aim is to find a common political base in order to build trust, unity, and resolve the problems of Shan State together.
On 26 February, the RCSS issued another statement that it is temporarily shelving its Committee for Shan State Unity (CSSU) membership, due to the Committee's inability to resolve the conflict between the two Shan political parties and the two Shan armies. Besides, it also cannot foster unity among ethnic groups within Shan State and is unable to set clear and transparent political goals. Moreover, CSSU member representatives' participation and decision-making rights are inadequate and not based on membership.
The irony is that RCSS took the lead to form the CSSU in October 2013, which included itself, Shan State Progressive Party/Shan State Army (SSPP/SSA), Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD) and Shan Nationalities Democratic Party (SNDP) and various Shan civil society organizations.
Clearly, the RCSS is blaming the CSSU for its military setback and humiliation, because the SNLD which has been depending on forging the Shan unity on CSSU lately is near to the SSPP and also accepts the political lead of the SNLD at least formally in the past, even though this cannot be said in actual political decision-making and implementation sense. For example, the SNLD call to the SSPP to stop the armed conflict with the RCSS was never heeded.
LIGHT AT THE END OF THE TUNNEL?
Uncertainty surrounds the current power structure in north and south Shan State as the RCSS licks its wounds and rumours circulate that the RCSS headquarters Loi Tai Leng may be attacked, which is unlikely.
Will the conflict morph into a Cold War-like conflict, with China on one side and Thailand plus the West on the other?
Probably not.
According to the expert with decades of experience in Shan and ethnic politics, Thailand won't mind the Myanmar army's influence at its border, but certainly not the UWSA, which it sees as China's expansionism knocking at its door.
Will the war go on unabated? Or are there whispers of a possible truth?
From the beginning of March, the RCSS and SSPP fighting was said to have stopped suddenly. Locals were said to be surprised that the two armies' soldiers when they met were not shooting at each other, which wasn't quite normal.
One explanation was that the two are engaged in a series of secret meetings starting 20 February to 7 March. They are said to have already met twice since, to iron out problems among themselves, that could mean from demarcation of territories to political outlook adjustment to reaching a common understanding.
However, since both parties are tight-lipped and super-secretive, and nothing concrete has been revealed, any hint of a light at the end of the tunnel should be viewed with caution.
CSSU Manifesto
Ironically, the goals of RCSS and the CSSU Manifesto, which was made public also on 75th Shan National Day anniversary, are nearly identical.
The manifesto Declaration writes:
- We, the Committee for Shan State Unity, recognize and respect the identities of all nationalities residing in the State.
- We shall work towards properly recognizing the rights to representation of individuals who are the original owners of the State's sovereignty.
- We shall equally value and recognize all the nationalities residing in the State and cooperate with them on matters that are mutually beneficial.
- We shall take approaches that are going to bring about free and peaceful living conditions that encourages war-free, conflict-free competition.
- We shall work with all respective organizations / stakeholders to be able to collectively design and adopt constitution of our State that guarantees basic human rights, democratic rights, equality and rights to self-determination, ethnic, religious, and cultural rights for all of the people of the state.
In closing it states:
- This manifesto envisions the dreams that the people of the State have for the future.
- The Committee for Shan State Unity extends our invitation to everyone who believes in this manifesto. The Committee for Shan State Unity does not claim ownership of this manifesto alone.
- Either individuals who believe in this manifesto or organizations that do are welcome to cooperate with the Committee for Shan State Unity by implementing the polices in respective areas in their own ways. And we hereby announce “the manifesto of the Committee for Shan State Unity” and vow to find ways to discuss and negotiate with the people and organizations that are yet to accept the manifesto in its entirety.
Even then, there is a faint hope that the two armies will come to terms and implement the CSSU manifesto declaration in words and deed, so that the carnage and all the woes surrounding the Shan State and its population all these years could be ended, including blocking the ongoing proxy war.
